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1. Introduction
Bubbles persist for long periods. During this time, many market participants argue that stock prices
are too highly valued and they share the opinion that stock prices have deviated from their
fundamentals. Nevertheless, many traders still do not sell their stock holdings. In other words, bubbles
persist because the market impact is not supplied for long periods. The object of this paper is to
analyze the mechanism behind the bubble bursting. Put more concretely, we analyze the way a market
maker finds the occurrence of a bubble before the time when the market impact is not supplied.
In general, positive bubbles persist when arbitrage is limited. The efficient market hypothesis
suggests that bubbles do not exist in a market with rational arbitrageurs because arbitrage is unlimited.
Under the efficient market hypothesis, all arbitrageurs receive fundamental information at the same
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This paper presents a model that explains why asset bubbles collapse despite any delay in
arbitrage. An endogenous mechanism for bubble bursting that persists under synchronization risk
is examined. Previous studies have shown that bubbles under synchronization risk collapse when
a market impact is supplied. This analysis argues that the bubble may collapse before this time
when a market maker who maximizes expected profits is considered. In other words, the bubble
collapses because of the market maker’s price−correction behavior before full arbitrage.
Accordingly, the market maker’s behavior in maximizing his or her own expected profit
contributes to the bubble bursting earlier than expected.
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?time. As result, arbitrageurs wish to sell when the market stock price exceeds the fundamental stock
price: the stock price will fall towards the fundamental price.
On the other hand, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) prove that bubbles can exist in markets where
rational arbitrageurs exist. (Hereafter, Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2002) and (2003) models are
referred to as AB (2002) and AB (2003), respectively.) AB (2003) consider a model in which accurate
fundamental information is sequentially received by the arbitrageurs. Their model assumes that each
arbitrageur cannot know how many arbitrageurs have already received this fundamental information.
Because of this, each arbitrageur cannot know whether the bubble will collapse or not through their
own selling order.
AB (2003) define this arbitrage strategy as ‘timing the bubble’. The arbitrageur also has the
possibility of obtaining capital gain by a delay in selling. There is also the prospect of a capital loss
should the bubble collapse before selling. Therefore, each arbitrageur calculates their subjective
probability of whether the bubble collapses before the next time period. The arbitrageur then
calculates the expected value of the capital gain and loss using this subjective probability and does not
sell out of the stock while the expected profit remains positive: that is, the difference between the
expected value of the capital gain and loss. In other words, arbitrageurs cannot synchronize their sales
because the fundamental information is not common knowledge and bubbles persist because
arbitrageurs time the bubble. AB (2002) define this risk of a bubble’s persistence as ‘synchronization
risk’. Their model assumes that bubbles collapse when selling orders reach a threshold. As the
threshold is exogenously determined, it does not depend on any endogenous pricing mechanism, such
as the market maker’s pricing rule or each trader’s behavior.
There are two extensions in our model. First, this paper explicitly considers the process of trading.
The trading players comprise one market maker, arbitrageurs, and noise traders. We also explicitly
consider the market maker’s price−setting rule. It is assumed that the market maker cannot receive any
fundamental information. In addition, we assume that the market maker calculates the subjective
probability of whether the bubble exists and sequentially updates her belief at each time using Bayes
Rule. At the time when the expected profit of the market maker becomes negative, she corrects the
stock price in favor of the fundamental price and the bubble collapses. Second, we consider three
types of noise traders: a market where pessimists and arbitrageurs exist; a market where neutral noise
traders and arbitrageurs exist; and one where optimists and arbitrageurs exist. We then compare the
difference in timing when the market maker corrects the mispricing in each type of market.
The conclusions of this paper are summarized by the following three points. First, the market maker
corrects the price when the market impact is supplied, and this is fastest in the market where
arbitrageurs and optimists exist. Second, the market maker may correct the price when not enough
market impact is supplied. Third, the market maker’s price−correction behavior does not occur when
there is no market impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the extant literature
relating to our paper. Section 3 describes our model. In Section 4, we analyze the model equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes.
????? 2008 ? 283 ?Market Maker’s Price−correction Behavior towards Synchronization Risk
?2. Related Literature
Bubbles persist because of limits to arbitrage. One possible explanation for these limits to arbitrage
is that noise traders take opposing positions to arbitrageurs. De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) consider this mechanism. De Long et al.’s (1990) model assumes that arbitrageurs’
short horizon towards noise traders and risk aversion causes the limits to arbitrage. Alternatively,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) refer to a model where the bubble is caused by noise traders. Another
explanation of limits to arbitrage is that it is caused by synchronization risk. AB (2002) and AB
(2003)? consider this mechanism in a continuous time setting. However, Sakawa and Watanabel
(2006) provide a sufficient condition of the existence of synchronization risk and its existence is
empirically shown by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004).
A number of previous studies have considered why bubbles collapse. Blanchard (1979, 1982), for
example, examines stochastic bubbles. Fukuta (1998) considers incompletely bursting bubbles, and
shows that these include stochastic bubbles. In terms of market maker behavior, O’Hara (1997) and
Biais et al. (2005) provide detailed surveys. Typically, there are two kinds of models that analyze
market maker behavior. Initially, Kyle (1985) introduces a batch−clearing market where market
makers, arbitrageurs, and noise traders coexist. Kyle’s model analyzes how risk−neutral market
makers extract the price information from the total net order flow. Kyle’s model shows that the
efficient price is achieved in the terminal trading period. On the other hand, Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) introduce a continuous auction market. In their model, arbitrageurs are defined as traders who
only receive fundamental information. In that market, the market maker sequentially changes the price
by the order of arrival and whether it is a selling or buying order.
3. Model
In this section, we describe a model setting that extends AB (2003). In this model, there are
arbitrageurs, noise traders, and a market maker. Subsection 3.1 introduces the discrete−time
approximation model of AB (2003), and the arbitrageurs’ optimal strategy is defined. Subsection 3.2
analyzes the information structure. Subsection 3.3 describes the differences between AB (2003) and
the current model. Subsection 3.4 introduces the noise traders’ behavior. Subsection 3.5 specifies the
market maker’s behavior.
3. 1. The Discrete−time Approximation Model of AB (2003)
The discrete−time approximation of AB’s (2003) model is as follows. We represent discrete time as
0 t0  t1   tn , and a length of one trading period as    ti1tii n  . We consider a
market where m risk−neutral arbitrageurs exist (m is a natural number). There is only one risky stock
in the market. Each arbitrageur has 1m  units of stock. We define the sequence of stock prices as
1 Chamley (2004) provides a useful survey of this work.
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? i , and the sequence of fundamental prices as vi . The interest rate on the risk−free (or safe) asset is r .
At time tb , a positive shock occurs and a bubble emerges. Prior to time tb , the price of the stock is
equal to its fundamental price:  i  vi   1g  ib( ) i b( ), and the interest rate is g  r( ). In
other words, the fundamental price is higher than the safe rate before time tb . At time tb , the shock
occurs and the fundamental’s growth rate is adjusted to the safe interest rate. Accordingly, the bubble
emerges after time tb : i   1g  ib( )  vi   1r( ) ib( ) . This model treats time tb as a
random variable. The probability distribution function of tb is a discrete−exponential function:
F tb( ) 1 12b .
It is assumed that there are only rational arbitrageurs in the market. After the shock at time tb , the
stock price deviates from the fundamental value. Between tb1 and tbm, rational arbitrageurs become
sequentially aware of the new fundamental value at a uniform rate. An individual arbitrageur who
becomes aware of the change in fundamentals at time tj believes that tb is distributed between tjm and
tj1. We denote this type of arbitrageur by j . If b  j 1, this arbitrageur is the first to realize that
the fundamental value has deviated from the stock price. If b  j m , all other traders have already
received this information. Arbitrageur j does not know the precise timing of the shock. Therefore, the
shock’s information is not common knowledge among arbitrageurs. Arbitrageur j sells out their stock
for an arbitrage profit after learning the shock’s information. As the shock’s information arrives at a
uniform rate, the amount of arbitrageur selling orders gradually increases, but the selling is not
synchronized.
The discrete version of AB (2003) assumes that mispricing is corrected at the time when the
arbitrageurs’ selling orders cross a threshold k 1( ); this time is tb. The bubble persists as long as
the arbitrageurs’ selling pressure remains below k . We consider the symmetric equilibrium that all
arbitrageurs take a symmetric strategy. Each arbitrageur j estimates the crash probability after
noticing the mispricing. The arbitrageur can then calculate the expected profit of the capital gain when
the bubble does not burst during the next time period, and the expected loss of holding a stock when
the bubble does burst during the next time period. The optimal strategy of each arbitrageur j is to sell
the stock when the expected profit of capital gain becomes equal to the expected loss of holding stock.
In this setting, two propositions are established as in AB (2003).
Proposition 1 Trigger strategy: In equilibrium, arbitrageur j sells out the stock at time tj1 after
noticing the shock and arbitrageur j does not buy back the stock. Arbitrageur j takes the optimal
strategy when delaying selling the stock.
Proposition 2 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Each arbitrageur j holds a stock during the
periods when the expected profit of capital gain is higher than the expected loss due to crash
(arbitrage profit). They sell out stock at the time when their arbitrage profit becomes zero. Mispricing
is corrected when an arbitrageur j j  b 1  sells out.
The proofs of above two propositions are given as in Sakawa and Watanabel (2006).
3. 2. Information Structure
There are information asymmetries between arbitrageurs and the other players. In other words,
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?Table 1: Information Structure
Player Fundamentals Information Rule
Market maker  
Arbitrageurs  
Noise traders
fundamental information that concerns the accurate fundamental level is sequentially spread to
arbitrageurs. The fundamental information is sequentially informed after time tb .
The shock’s occurrence at time tb is commonly known to arbitrageurs, noise traders, and the market
maker. Because fundamental information is not received by the noise traders and the market maker,
they cannot judge whether the shock really falls to the fundamental price. Arbitrageurs who received
the fundamental information cannot know that the stock really falls to the fundamental price.
Under the above information structure, the bubble does not burst at time tb . The market maker does
not know that the bubble bursting at time tb is incorrect. Thus, the market maker has a belief that the
price level is equal to the fundamental level. Table 1 shows each agent’s information structure.  
signifies that the player has that information.
Table 1 shows that the market maker and noise traders cannot receive the fundamental information.
This model refers to a situation where arbitrageurs do not know about the market maker’s price−
setting rule. In reality, the market maker monopolizes book information in major markets such as the
New York Stock Exchange. On this basis, asymmetric information between the market maker and
other traders is a realistic assumption. As the market maker computes the relevant price based on book
information, arbitrageurs do not know how the market maker sets the price.
3. 3. The Features of This Model
There are four unique settings in this paper not considered by AB (2003). First, noise traders are
introduced into this model. It is assumed that one noise trader enters the market during one trading
interval and buys the stock, sells the stock, or does not trade during the same trading interval.
Second, we explicitly consider the market maker’s behavior. AB (2003) implicitly considers the
market maker, and mispricing is corrected when the arbitrageur’s selling orders cross a threshold k .
On the other hand, this paper assumes that the market maker corrects the price upon noticing the
arbitrageurs selling. Because the market maker knows that arbitrageurs have fundamental information,
the market maker notices the mispricing through their selling behavior. The market maker who finds
the arbitrageurs’ selling recalculates the relevant price, vi   1r( ) ib( )  , and they notice that the
previous price is too high. Therefore, the mispricing is corrected as early as possible to avoid the
additional loss of carrying inventory. Noise traders do not discover the mispricing until the market
maker corrects the price. The mispricing then becomes common knowledge. In addition, the market
maker’s revenue is the service charge for traders at each time, as in the following definition.
Definition 1 The market maker observes an order sequence and corrects the price upon noticing the
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?arbitrageurs selling. During periods where it is not noticed, mispricing is corrected when the expected
loss of accepting the orders is higher than the expected profit. The market maker’s revenue is the
service charge for traders at each time. She receives a transaction cost at a charge of C per 1m
 
units
of trading, and this transaction cost becomes her gain. Even if traders do not order, they have to pay
the charge for participating in the market.
Third, arbitrageurs have incorrect beliefs about the market maker’s price−setting rule. The next
definition represents the arbitrageurs’ beliefs.
Definition 2 Arbitrageurs believe that the market maker corrects the price when the total selling
orders cross a threshold k after time tb .
Finally, it is assumed that agents who order at each time in this market include one arbitrageur and
one noise trader. Traders (including both arbitrageurs and noise traders) who trade once exit the
market. In this market, orders at each time are executed when an arbitrageur orders the opposite side
against a noise trader or market maker’s inventory. If the order at one time is not executed, the order
becomes the market maker’s inventory the next time.
3. 4. Noise Traders’ Behavior
This model defines noise traders as follows. It is assumed that the population of noise traders at
each time is one. Each noise trader has a 1m
 
unit of stocks, and noise traders who order exit the
market.
There are three types of noise trader, namely, optimists, neutral noise traders, and pessimists. This
paper analyzes differences in the time of price correction among the markets where the different types
of noise traders exist. A noise trader’s behavior is as follows: pS
N (k ) represents the probability that
noise trader sells at time tk , and pB
N (k ) is the probability that the noise trader buys at time tk .
pS
N (k ) pBN (k )   23p p  p  0 23  
The optimist has a probability that satisfies pB
N (k )pSN (k ). The pessimist has a probability that
satisfies pB
N (k )pSN (k ). The neutral noise trader has a probability that satisfies pBN (k ) pSN (k ) 13.
In other words, neutral noise traders place orders randomly.
3. 5. The Market Maker’s Behavior
In this model, we assume the batch auction systems in each time interval and a monopolistic market
maker suspects the mispricing at time tb1 when the first arbitrageur b1 receives the fundamental
information. The market maker can know the shock at time tb , but cannot know whether the
fundamental level is pushed down by the shock or not. The market maker has an incentive to know the
difference between the mispricing and fundamental price because she cannot receive the fundamental
information. The market maker observes an order sequence at each time, and extracts the information
whether the arbitrageur sells or not. In each time interval, the market maker gathers the aggregate
orders in the market. In other words, this market adopts batch auction systems and consists of discrete
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?Table 2: Binary Model
Prk sk      sk 1 sk 0 1 p 1p 0 1q q
and n1( ) periods.
In this market, arbitrageurs take the symmetric trigger strategy defined in Proposition 1. We define
binary state space  (01).  1 means that each arbitrageur j sells out at time, and  0 means
that arbitrageur j does not sell out at time tj . This model defines a net trading selling order’s quantity
at time tk as a signal sk 0tk tn( ).
The market maker updates her belief, observing the net trading quantity at each trading time. We
define the market maker’s subjective probability as whether the arbitrageurs sell as per their belief.
The market maker updates this belief with Bayes Rule. The market maker has a belief
Prk1  1 sk    at each next time tk1 after arbitrageurs receive the signal sk . The market maker
notices the mispricing when her belief reaches 1. This binary model is expressed in Table 2.
The market maker’s belief is updated as below.?
Pr k1  1 sk  
Pr k1  0 sk  Pr k  1( )Prk  0( )Pr k sk   1  Pr k sk   0   (1)
Bayes Rule is the same as the Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR) updating method when the number of
states is finite.?We define the LLR at time tk as k . k is defined as the LLR at the time before
receiving a signal sk .k lnPr k  1( )
Prk  0( )k1 is similarly defined as the LLR at time after receiving a signal sk .k1lnPr k1  1 sk  
Pr k1  0 sk  
The LLR’s updating equation is as follows: the LLR’s multiplier ln p1q represents the LLR’s
variation.k1k lnPr k sk 1  1  
Pr k sk 1  0  k ln p1q  (2)
2 Using the property of Bayes Rule, the following two equations are established:
Prk1  1sk  
Prk1  0sk  Prk1  1 sk  Prk1  0 sk  Pr sk( )Pr sk( )Prk1  1 sk  Prk1  0 sk  
Prk1  1sk  
Prk1  0sk  Prk sk   1  Prk sk   0  Prk  1( )Prk  0( )
3 Chamley (2004) refers to this method.
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?Table 3: Probability Structure of a Signal
Prk sk      sk 2 sk 1 sk 0 sk 1 1 2
3
p 1
3
p 0 0 0 2
3
p 1
3
p
The exponential of the LLR above means the ratio of the market maker’s belief.
exp k( )Pr k  1( )
Prk  0( ) (3)
The equation above is equivalent to the following equation.
Pr k  1( )exp k( )Pr k  0( )exp k( ) 1Pr k  1( )  
We can calculate the market maker’s belief at time tk by solving the above equation.
Pr k  1( ) exp k( )1exp k( )
Now, we explain the market maker’s belief at time tk .
Pr k  1( )Pr k  0( )   exp k( )1exp k( ) 11exp k( )  (4)
4. Equilibrium Analysis
This section analyzes the market maker’s price−correction time in the market where both
arbitrageurs and noise traders exist. Subsection 4.1 analyzes a time when two selling orders ( 2m

units
of selling order) arrive. Subsection 4.2 analyzes a time when one selling order ( 1m

units of selling
order) arrives. Subsection 4.3 analyzes a time when no selling order arrives.
We assume both arbitrageurs and noise traders exist in this market. Arbitrageurs follow the trigger
strategy explained in Proposition 1. They hold their stock before time tb1 , and they sell out at the
time after tb11. Before time tb1 , only noise traders trade, and after time tb11, noise traders trade
and arbitrageurs sell out. The number of orders that arrive before time tb1 can be (1,0,−1), and the
number of orders that arrive after time tb11 can be (2,1,0). Therefore, the market’s number of
selling orders at each time becomes s  2101 .
It is assumed that the market maker’s prior belief Prb ( 1) is equal to some positive value. As
the market maker has no prior information at time tb , a signal’s probability is expressed in Table 3.
There is the possibility of price correction at time tk when the signal sk is 2, 1, or 0, because the
market maker corrects the price when she finds that  equals 1. We show in the next subsection that
the market maker corrects the mispricing when two selling orders arrive. In the period when two
selling orders do not arrive, the market maker corrects the mispricing when the expected loss of
accepting the orders is higher than the expected profit of doing so. The market maker may correct the
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?mispricing at time tk when one or no selling orders arrive.? In other words, she corrects the mispricing
when not enough market impact is supplied.
We also consider two cases where the market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk when one or
no selling orders arrive.
4. 1. Two Selling Orders at Time tk
In this market, the following proposition exists.
Proposition 3 The market maker corrects the price when two selling orders arrive in the market
where arbitrageurs and noise traders trade.
Proof
If the market maker at time tk receives the signal sk  2, Equation (3) becomes: k1 ln pr k1  1sk  2  
pr k1  0sk  2   : the LLR’s multiplier diverges to infinity.
By probability’s property, pr k1  1sk  2  pr k1  0sk  2   1.
If two equations exist, then pr k1  1sk  2   1: the market maker finds the mispricing at
time tk1.?
The intuition of this proposition is that the market maker extracts the fundamental information from
two selling orders. It is interpreted that two selling orders supply a market impact. After time tk when
two selling orders arrive, the market maker corrects the mispricing to avoid the expected loss of future
execution.
Proposition 3 shows that the price−correction time is when two selling orders arrive, but this time is
different for each type of noise trader in the market. As pr k1 sk  2 1   1 is not equal to
one, the time when two selling orders arrive cannot be uniquely determined. This time depends on the
type of noise trader.
Simulations of price−correction times in three markets are represented in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure
1 corresponds to the market where pessimists p  01  and arbitrageurs exist. Figure 2 corresponds
to the market where neutral noise traders p  13 and arbitrageurs exist. Figure 3 corresponds to the
market where optimists p  06  and arbitrageurs exist. The numerical value is given as follows:
tb1 t11, g  01, r  005. The noise traders’ orders at each time are generated by random
sampling numbers following discrete−uniform distribution.?
Figures 1, 2, and 3 give a sample path of mispricing persistence. Mispricing occurs at time
t11  tb1( ). However, the price−correction time differs among the three markets. These figures show
that it takes the longest time to arrive at two selling orders in the market where optimists and
arbitrageurs exist. The interpretation of this result is that it takes a long time for the market maker to
extract fundamental information in this market because of the optimists’ tendency to buy the stock.
4 −1 order does not come after the time tb1 because the arbitrageur sells one stock at each time.
5 Each noise trader buys when a random sampling number is included in the interval 0p ) , does not trade when
p13p ) , and sells when 13p1 .
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4. 2. One Selling Order at Time tk
Equation (3) means that when one selling order arrives, the LLR increases by ln 1 32 3 p  . When
p 13, the LLR goes up. On the other hand, the LLR goes down in the market where pessimists exist
p 13  . Thus, the market maker’s belief increases in the market where pessimists exist. On the other
hand, the market maker’s belief falls in a market with optimists.
We consider that the expected loss of accepting the orders is higher than the expected profit of
doing so. The capital loss of one inventory at 1 is 1g  k b( )  1r( ) k b( ) when the market
maker corrects the mispricing. The income gain in both states is 2C. Therefore, the expected profit of
filling one selling order at time tk becomes 2C  Pr k 1( ) 1g  k b( )  1r( ) k b( ) . The
market maker corrects the mispricing at the time when the expected profit becomes negative. When
she corrects the mispricing at time tk1, Equations (5) and (6) are established.
2C  Pr k 1( ) 1g  k b( )  1r( ) k b( ) 0 (5)
2C  Pr k 1( ) 1g  k b( )  1r( ) k b( ) 0 (6)
Equation (5) means that at time tk , the market maker does not correct the mispricing because the
?????? ?? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ???
???????????? ????????
?????? ?? ?????? ????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???
???????????? ????????
?????? ?? ?????? ????? ???? ???? ??? ???????????? ????????
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?expected profit is positive. Equation (6) means that at time tk 1, the market maker corrects the
mispricing because the expected profit is equal to or lower than the expected loss from price
correction. Equations (2) and (4) can be equivalent to the relation below.
exp  k 1  exp  k  ln 1323p  23p  exp  k( )
Pr k 1 1( ) exp  k 1  1 exp  k 1   23p  exp  k( )1  23p  exp  k( ) (7)
Equations (5) and (6) are calculated by Equation (7) as follows.
2C 23p  
1 g   kb( ) 1 r( ) kb( ) 2C 13p  Pr k 1( ) 2C1 g   kb( ) 1 r( ) kb( ) (8)
Pr k 1( ) 2C 23p  
1 g   kb( ) 1 r( ) kb( ) 2C 13p   (9)
Equation (8) shows the interval of the market maker’s belief at time tk in the market where
arbitrageurs and optimists exist. The left−hand side of the inequality is the lower bound value of the
market maker’s belief. When this inequality is not satisfied, the market maker does not correct the
mispricing at the next time tk 1.
Equation (9) shows the semi−interval of the market maker’s belief at time tk in the markets where
pessimists p 13 or neutral noise traders p 13 exist. If this inequality is satisfied, the market
maker corrects the mispricing at time tk . In this market, the market maker’s belief is a decreasing
function of time. As a result, the threshold of the market maker’s belief also becomes a decreasing
function of time.
These relations are expressed as a numerical example in Figures 4, 5, and 6. In these numerical
calculations, the numerical value is given as follows:  01, tb t11, g 01, r 005, C 01.
The dotted line represents the lower bound of the market maker’s belief when the market maker
corrects the mispricing at time tk 1. The solid line is the upper bound of the market maker’s belief
when the market maker does not correct the mispricing at time tk . These figures suggest that the two
upper bounds of the market maker’s belief are a decreasing function of trading time tk .
Figure 4 corresponds to the market where pessimists p 06  and arbitrageurs exist. Figure 5
corresponds to the market where neutral noise traders p 13 and arbitrageurs exist. Figure 6
corresponds to the market where optimists p 01  and arbitrageurs exist.
Area I in Figure 4 shows the market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk . Area II shows that the
market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk 1. Area III shows that the market maker does not
correct the mispricing at time tk 1.
Figure 5 shows that the two upper bounds of the market maker are the same because the neutral
noise trader’s belief is invalid to time.? This area shows that the market maker does not correct the
6 This is easily checked by substituting equation (8) into p 13.
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mispricing at time tk 1. Area II is where the market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk .
In Figure 6, Area I is where the market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk 1. Area II shows
that market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk . Therefore, the threshold of the solid line is not
binding. Areas I and II are where the market maker corrects the mispricing at time tk . Area III is where
the market maker does not correct the mispricing at time tk .
These intervals show that the upper bound of the market maker’s belief to correct the mispricing at
time tk has its smallest value in the market where optimists exist p  13  . In other words, the market
maker tends to correct the mispricing earlier. This is the opposite implication of the case of two selling
orders. When one selling order arrives, the market maker may correct the mispricing at the time when
either Equation (8) or (9) is satisfied.
The results of this subsection are as follows. First, a market maker may correct the mispricing at the
time when not enough market impact is supplied. Second, the market maker tends to correct the
mispricing earlier in the market where arbitrageurs and optimists exist because she knows that two
selling orders arrive earlier in this market. We can interpret this as meaning that, in this market, the
market maker has to be more cautious about the possibility of a bubble.
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?4. 3. No Selling Order at Time tk
In this case, one buying order from a noise trader and one selling order from an arbitrageur are
matched. No order comes to the market maker and she obtains a charge for participation from one
arbitrageur and one noise trader at each trading time. The expected loss of filling no selling orders at
time tk becomes 0. The expected profit of filling no selling orders at time tk becomes 2C. Therefore,
the market maker does not correct the mispricing at time tk because the expected profit is higher than
expected loss of price correction. In other words, the market maker does not correct the price when no
selling order arrives.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the market maker’s price−correction behavior towards synchronization risk. In
this model, the market maker extracts information whether or not arbitrageurs sell from an order
sequence using Bayes Rule. The result of the current analysis easily explains the process of price
correction towards synchronization risk. Price correction occurs when the number of selling orders
crosses the threshold κ in AB (2003). However, their paper assumes that the threshold κ is an
exogenous variable. In our model, the price−correction time is endogenously determined by
endogenous variables, including the type of noise trader and the market maker’s beliefs.
There are three main findings in this paper. First, the market maker corrects the price when market
impacts are supplied; this time is the longest in a market where arbitrageurs and optimists exist.
Second, the market maker may correct the price when one selling order arrives. In other words, she
may correct the price when not enough market impact is supplied. The numerical examples depicted in
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show that this time is the fastest in a market where arbitrageurs and optimists exist.
This can be interpreted such that the market maker has to be more cautious of the possibility of a
bubble in the optimists’ market because she knows that two selling orders arrive earlier in this market.
Third, the market maker’s price−correction behavior does not occur if no orders arrive.
This model can be extended to a more general analysis of an order sequence by following a normal
distribution. By using a normal distribution, we can describe the market where n (an arbitrary natural
number) orders arrive in one trading interval. This extension remains a challenge for future research.
(Graduate Student, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
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